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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

IDA AND JAMES WILLIAMS,
Plaintiffs and Appellant,

Case No.
-vs.-

ZION COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE
INSTITUTION,

8614

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This appeal is from a judgment of dismissal with
prejudice at the close of plaintiff's case.
Throughout this brief plaintiff and appellant, Ida
Williams, will be referred to as plaintiff and the defendand and respondent, Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, will be referred to as defendant.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The basis of defendant's nwtion was that the evidence conclusively shows plaintiff was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law (R. 66). It w.as stipulated
that the plaintiff, James Willian1s, be granted judgment
against the defendant for the sum of $157.40 and costs.
The cause of action of plaintiff arose out of .a collision which occurred on the 5th day of February, 1953 at
about 3 :25 P.M. at the intersection of "B" Street and
Third Avenue in Salt Lake City.
Plaintiff was driving a 1947 four door .sedan in a
southerly direction. As she .approached the intersection
while at a point about 25 feet north of the intersection
she s.aw a panel truck owned by defendant stopped at the
stop sign prO'tecting "B" Street fron1 traffic going east
on Third Avenue (R. 49, 50, 51). She then looked to the
east and proceeded through the intersection (R. 60).
No movement on the part of the truck at the .stop sign
was ever observed by plaintiff ( R. 59). After plaintiff
had started into the intersection, ·when her car was about
twenty-five feet fr01n the panel tnwk, it suddenly pulled
out into the intersection (R. 63, 65). The defendant's
truck struck the right side of the plaintiff's aut01nobile
at the right front door and 1niddle post on the right side.
At the moment of the impact plaintiff was driving about
20 miles per hour (H. 63, 64). •'B" Street is approximately 40 feet in width and Third Avenue slightly nar-
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rower. Both streets ac0omrnodate only two lanes of
traffic at the intersection (R. 58, 59).
As a result of the collision plaintiff suffered injury
and damage to her back and left side. The automobile
in which she wa,s riding careened off from the collision
and stopped at a point in the gutter on the east side of
"'B'' Street.
Frmn judgment that she was contributorily negligent
as a matter of law, plaintiff prosecutes this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT.

The Trial Court held that plaintiff had a duty even
though she was on a street protected by stop signs to
continuously watch the automobile which had stopped for
the intersection and avoid in every event any movement
by such automobile.
Section 41-6-74 U.C.A. 1953 covers intersections and
reads as follows:
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"The driver of a vehicle shall stop .as required by this act at the entrance to a through
highway and shall yield the right-of-way to other
vehicles which have entered the intersection from
said through highway or which are approaching
so closely on said through highway .as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver having
so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all
other vehicles approaching the intersection on said
through highway shall yield the right-of-way to
the vehicle so proceeding into or across the
through highway."
Plaintiff saw defendant's panel truck stopped at
the stop sign when she was twenty-five feet from the
intersection. Concerning the relative positions of the
vehicles in the intersection, plaintiff and the witness,
Singleton, testified:
"A.

Well, on nty way horne I was going south on

B Street. I saw the-there is a stop sign ther2
on Third Avenue, and I sa\v this Z. C. !I. I.
panel truck standing there as I was on my
way traveling south, you know, to on my way
home, and I thought that the truck was standing there with time for n1e to pass. He were
standing there. I saw it.

Q.

Did you proceed through the intersection'?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Now, did you ever, :J[ rs. \Yilliams, see the
panel truck start up frmn the stop sign~

A.

No.

Q.

What brought to your attention the f.act that
the truck had left the stop sign~
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A. When Mrs. Singleton screamed.

Q. And then what
A.
"Q.

A.

The impact."

happened~

(R. 13)

Mrs. Williams, approximately what speed
were you proceeding as you came through the
intersection of B Street and Third Avenue¥
Oh, not fast.

Q. Can you give us some idea of about how fast!
A.

Oh, about twenty-five miles an hour maybe.

Q. Now, as you proceeded through the intersection, did you see any other traffic in the intersection or near it~
A.

No.

Q. Let me ask you if you looked for other traffic.
A. I did.

Q. What direction did you look, Mrs. Williams?
A.

I looked to the east and west."

(R. 15-16)

"Q. I want you to give me your best recollection
how far away you were when you saw it7

A. I would say about twenty-five feet.

Q. North of the intersection 7
A. Yes.

Q. At that time this truck was stopped at the
stop sign, was it not 7

A. Yes.
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Q. Did you ever look again to see what happened
to that truck until after the accident~
A.

No."

(R. 50)

* * * *
"A.

No, Mr. Conder, after I saw the truck standing there, thinking he would stay there until
I passed, then there wasn't any reason for
me to keep watching him. If I had my head
turned watching hin1 I could have ran into
someone else.

Q.

(by Mr. Conder) You didn't watch him anytime after that~

A.

No.

Q.

How fast were you

A.

Not fast, a;bout twenty miles an hour." (R. 51)

traveling~

* * * *
"A.

No I don't know how long I looked at it.

Q. Were you proceeding during the time you
looked at it in your direction to the south at
the rate of twenty miles an hour~
A.

Yes.

Q.

While you looked at that truck, Mrs. Williams,
can you tell us any tin1e you were looking at
it you observed it 1nake any movement whatsoever~

A. No." (R. 59-60)
Witness Singleton

"Q. As you .approached the intersection of B
Stree1t and 3rd Avenue, tell what you observed.
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A.

As we approached the intersection of B Street
and 3rd A venue, there was a Z. C. M. I. truck
standing at the stop sign. We proceeded to
go on down and suddenly this truck pulled
out into the intersection.

Q.

Where were you in the intersection when you
saw the truck start to pull out 1

MR. CONDER: I think that would be immaterial
as far as this witness is concerned.
THE COURT: I will let her answer.
A.

Q.

We hadn't got into it exactly.
(by Mr. King) Will you tell us what happened~

A.

As we got into it, the truck came across
around and I yelled to her to look out.

Q.

Did you notice what Mrs. Williams did when
you yelled to her~

A.

She started to swerve the car around to keep
him from hitting her.

Q. Was she .able to do that 1
A.

No.
happened~
Shingleton~

Q. What

What happened then, Mrs.

A.

After the car was struck, in fact before it was
struck I yelled, as I said before, and we was
struck and we got into the gutter, or ditch,
or whatever it was, and a man got out.

Q.

What effect did the impact of the car have 1

A.

As the truck struck the car, it hit my side and
threw me over to her.
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Q.

\Vhere was the car

A.

On the right.

struck~

Q. Approxi1nately where on the

right~

A.

On the right door.

Q.

At the Inmnent of the impact, when it struck
you, approximately how fast was the car of
Mrs. Williams going~

:MR. CONDER: I object to an approximation.

Q.

(by Mr. King) Do you have an opinion how
fast you were going at that time, ~Irs. Singleton~

A.

About the same speed, she had never speeded
up.
fast~

Q.

That would be how

A.

About twenty miles."
:JI:

:JI:

(R. 63-64)
:JI:

:JI:

"Q. About how far were you from the truck when
it started to pull away~
A.

About how

far~

Q. Yes.
MR. CONDER: I object to it, it should be an
exact Ineasureinent, not an approximation.
Q.

(by l\Ir. l(ing) About how far, in your opinion, was the truck fr01n :.Mrs. \Villiam's car
when the truck started to pull out~

THE COURT: The objection is overruled, you
Inay answer.
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A.

I imagine about twenty-five feet."

(R. 65)

There is no (tnestion about the negligence of the
driver of the defendant's autmnobile. He left the stop
sign at a time wh2n the autmnobile driven by plaintiff
watJ obviously so close as to constitute an immediate
hazard.
The basic question presented by this appeal is did
the plaintiff have the duty to continue to keep her eye
on the stopped vehicle which was in .a place of safety and
did not appear to constitute a traffic hazard to her or
could she look to the e~ast and then turn and watch in the
direction in which she was driving without further observation to the west. A correlative question also presented is what could plaintiff have done even if she had
seen the defendant start up into the intersection.
That plaintiff submits that under the facts and circunlstances of this case there could not be presented a
purely legal question. At Inost it is a question of fact
whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
The general law seems to be clear. It is stated in
Volume 5A American Jurisprudence, page 686, section
712.
"A driver who makes reasonable observation
before entering an intersection i.s not contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to
make additional observation. When it appears
to be s.afe to cross an intersection, an automobile
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driver's contributory negligence in the light of
the defendant's unanticipated speed or other negligence is for the jury.
"Clearly, however, the fact that the plaintiff
proceeded into or across an inter.section with the
traffic signal or sign in his favor ordinarily precludes finding hun guilty of such negligence as a
matter of law, and he is sometimes held free of
contributory negligence .as a rnatter of law in such
circumstance.s."
See also: Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law
and Practice, Volurne 10, Part 2, Section 6619 P. 10-17,
and 1956 Cumulative Pocket Part, No. 6619, P. 7-20.
The general rule, which is recited by American Jurisprudence and by Blashfield has been on numerous occasions reeognized and cited by this court in its interseCtion cases. The most recent case which plaintiff has
been able to discover is Bates v. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180,
281 P. 2d 209.
In the Bates case the question of negligence of a
driver approaching a through highway on a disfavored
highway was found by this Court to be a question of fact.
Bates observed the autonw bile of the defendant approaching him at one hundred fifty feet on a through
highway but since he had conunenced to cross the intersection he proceeded with the right-of-way in his favor.
Certainly if Bates was not contributorily negligent as
n1atter of law in proceeding aeross the through highway
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watching other tr.affjc which 1night be in the vicinity,
plaintiff, here, cannot be so held. She proceeded into the
intersection after observing that the defendant was stopped at the stop sign and apparently was waiting for her
to cross. At t~12 ti:me she observed defendant, plaintiff
y,ras obviously so close to the intersection as to constitute
an imn1eC:i.ate hazard. Defendant pulled only a short way
into the intersection and .struck the automobile of the
plaintiff at the front door and towards the middle of the
car. This would dernonstrate that plaintiff was over half
way through the intersection before the defendant even
moved.
This Court has not had before it the exact f.acts
which are the basis of the trial court's ruling. But on
numerous occasions has had before it intersection collisions which present a ruore difficult and closer question
as far as contributory negligence is concerned. In the
following cases this Court has .steadfastly held that in
intersection collisions where tirne, distance, and other
such important factors are rnatters of opinion and usually
driver opinion the question of negligence and contributory negligence are matters which should be left for the
jury to determine. See the following: Beck v. Jeppesen,
1 Utah 2d 127, 262 P. 2d 760; Martin v. Stevens, ______ Utah
______ , 243 P. 2d 747; Poulsen v. Manness, ______ Utah ______ ,
241 P. 2d 152; Lowder v. Hallen, 120 Utah 231, 233 P. 2d
350; Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Utah 478, 189 P. 2d 127.
All of the cited eases denwnstrate the basic principal

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
that in intersection collisions the question.s of fact are
so close and the application of standards of care are so
nicely balanced that the jury must be left to apply the
standards and determine the basic facts.
There are several eases frorn jurisdiction other than
Utah similar to the situation before the Court. One of
the most interesting cases is Pollind v. Polich, 78 Cal.
App. 2d 87, 177 P. 2d 63. In this case the person on the
disfavored roadway observed the favored driver approaching approximately two hundred feet away. The
question was whether or not the favored driver was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in failing to observe the disfavored driver leave the stop sign and proceed into the intersection. The California Statute is
similar to the Utah law quoted. The Court stated:
"Defendant had a right to assume not only
that the car in which plaintiff was riding would
make the required stop at 43rd Street, until he observed or, in the exercise of ordinary care, would
have observed that the driver was not making a
stop, but also that the Ford car would not enter
the intersection in front of cars approaching so
closely as to constitute an i1nmediate hazard. Defendant testified that he saw the Ford car approaching when it wa.s about 30 feet west of the
intersection, but as he was passing the Pulliam car
his view of the Ford was obstructed .as he approached the intersection, and that he assumed
that Secrest, the Ford driver, would stop long
enough to allow his car and the Pulliam car to
pass through the intersection first. He also testi-
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fied that he next saw the Ford when it was about
12 or 15 feet in front of him, but that he the defendant, could not swerve to the right to avoid a
collision because of the Pulliam car. Secrest testified that he saw the Pulliam car approaching but
did not see that of defendant. It was clearly a
question of f.act whether defendant was guilty of
negligence in assuming that Secrest would not
enter the intersection in front of his car and that
of Pulliam, but would re1nain at the boulevard
stop sign until the two cars had passed." (Pag8
65)
An additional authority directly at point concerning
the duty of the person on a through highway is De Priest
t:. City of Glendale, 74 Cal. App. 2d 464, 169 P. 2d 17.
Here the plaintiff admittedly failed to maintain a constant lookout as he approached the intersection and did
not observe the car which came into collision with him.
The California Court following the general rule again
held that under the facts and circumstances the negligence and contributory negligence were questions of fact
for the jury to determine.
One of the most important cases which seems to be
directly in point is Mead v. Cochran, 184 F. 2d 579. This
case involved an accident on the open highway. The defendant left a stop sign after stopping and turned in
front of the plaintiff's automobile. There was a collision.
The hasic question was whether or not plaintiff was contributorily negligent .since his testimony indicated that
he did not see the defendant's car at any time prior to
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the impact. The Federal Circuit Court following the
general rule held this was a question of fact to be submitted to the jury to apply the basic standards of care
on the part of the driver of the automobile on the through
highway. The following quote sets forth the facts and
ruling:
"Furthennore, plaintiff did testify that he
looked to his left about 100 feet from the intersection, and that before reaching that point there
were trees and bushes on his left along old Route
40 which obstructed his view. Under the circumstances it might be that defendant's stationary
car did not make a permanent mental impression
upon the plaintiff. Defendant's automobile had
been at a standstill at some point within 15 to 23
feet distant from the pavement of new Route 40.
Defendant suddenly started his automobile in motion, intending to cross the center line of New
Route 40 and then s\ving to his left in order to
proceed along it in a northeasterly direction.

* *

:I:

*

"-Under the facts of this case we believe that
the question of contributory negligence wa_s a
question of fact for the jury.'' (Page 581)
In Foresman v. Pepin, 71 F. Supp. 772, affirmed
161 F. 2d 872. Plaintiff approached on a through highway and observed that on her left the traffic on the highway was stopped, she then proceeded to cross through
the intersection and did not look to the right to see the
truck of defendant which was approaching and which
ultin1ately cmne into collision with her. It was conceded
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that if paintiff had looked to the right at the intersection
she may have been able to avoid the collision with the
truck owned by the defendant. The Federal District
Court submitted the case to the jury. He overruled the
motions for a new trial and was affirmed on appeal.
Held that the contributory negligence of plaintiff w.as a
question of fact for the jury.
The discussion in the Foresman case concerns the
normal habits of drivers who are on through highways
and who cross intersections where other traffic is waiting. Once a driver commits himself to a certain course
of conduct, i.e., crossing the intersection, additional observ.ation may or may not be possible. The significance
of the driver's actions in either causation or in applying
the standards of care is for the jury to determine. It
would be a very unusual situation if the driver could
prevent collision should another vehicle enter the intersection after he had commenced the crossing.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the lookout which
a person approaching an intersection on a through highway must make is dependent upon the surrounding circumstance.s. Whether the lookout is one which a reasonably prudent person would make must be left to the
jury for its determination. Whether the making of additional observations would have prevented the collision is
also a f.act question. The Trial Court erroneously de-
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tennined these fact questions as matter of law and his
decision should be reversed.
Respectively submitted,

DWIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant

2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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